Abstract-Many solutions and concepts in resource allocation and game theory rely on the assumption of a convex utility set. In this paper, we show that the less restrictive assumption of a logarithmic "hidden" convexity is sometimes sufficient. We consider the problems of Nash bargaining and proportional fairness, which are closely related. We extend the Nash bargaining framework to a broader family of log-convex sets. We then focus on the set of feasible signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios (SINRs), for the cases of individual power constraints and a sum power constraint. Under the assumption of log-convex interference functions, we show how Pareto optimality of boundary points depends on the interference coupling between the users. Finally, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for strict log-convexity of the feasible SINR region.
I. INTRODUCTION

P
ERFORMANCE tradeoffs in multiuser systems occur when users share a common resource or if they are coupled by mutual interference. This is typical for wireless systems, and also for certain wireline connections, e.g., twisted-pair copper wires used for DSL transmission. The achievable performance is commonly characterized by the utility set, sometimes referred to as utility region or quality-of-service (QoS) region. The utility region is defined as the set of all achievable utility vectors , where is the number of users.
Many resource allocation strategies crucially depend on the structure of the set , so a thorough understanding of its boundary is needed. Some often-made assumptions are comprehensiveness, convexity, and Pareto optimality. Comprehensiveness can be interpreted as free disposability of utility. Convexity allows the application of well-known concepts from optimization and game theory. Pareto optimality is a notion of efficiency, requiring that one cannot make someone better off without making someone else worse off. A Pareto optimal operating point is "efficient" in the sense that the available system resources are fully utilized. Whether these properties are fulfilled or not depends on many factors, including the choice of the performance measure, and system constraints. If the users are coupled by mutual interference then interference mitigation techniques play an important role. This can lead to complicated "cross-layer" dependencies with intractable problem formulations. In order to analyze the utility tradeoffs between the users, we need to make some assumptions regarding the underlying system. In this paper, the following cases will be studied.
Strictly log-convex utility sets (Section II). This class is broader than the class of convex sets, which is contained as a special case. It is shown that the core properties of the game-theoretic framework of Nash bargaining [1] are preserved under strict log-convexity. In this case, the Nash bargaining solution is equivalent to proportional fairness [2] .
Log-convex interference functions (Sections III and IV). The utilities are assumed to be strictly monotone and continuous functions of the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios (SINRs). The interference coupling between the users is modeled by means of axiomatic log-convex interference functions [3] . Power constraints are assumed. Based on the system dependency matrix, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for Pareto optimality of boundary points.
In Section V we provide a sufficient condition for an SINR set from Section III to be strictly log-convex. If this is fulfilled, then we known from the results of Section II that a unique Nash bargaining solution exists. These results extend previous work [3] , where only log-convexity was shown and [4] where strict log-convexity was only shown for linear interference functions.
These results have in common that they all rely on a logarithmic convexity. In Section II the utility set itself is assumed to be log-convex, while in Sections III-V we assume log-convex interference functions.
Note, that the requirement of log-convexity is weaker than the customary assumption of convexity. Thus the results are applicable to a broader class of problems. Log-convexity is a useful property that allows the application of convex optimization techniques to certain nonconvex problems. This is sometimes referred to as "hidden convexity." Log-convexity was already successfully exploited in different other contexts, e.g., [5] - [11] .
An important aspect of our work is the presence of power constraints. Without power constraints, strict log-convexity follows 0018-9448/$26.00 © 2011 IEEE easily from the results [3] if the underlying interference functions are strictly log-convex. However, with power constraints, and especially individual power constraints, proving strictness requires a different mathematical approach involving combinatorial arguments.
We use the following notational conventions. Matrices and vectors are denoted by bold capital letters and bold lowercase letters, respectively. The th component of a vector is denoted by or, equivalently, by . The notation means that for all components , and means componentwise inequality with strict inequality for at least one component. Similar definitions hold for the reverse directions. Finally, means that the vectors differ in at least one component. The set of nonnegative reals is denoted as , and the set of positive reals is denoted as .
II. EXTENSION OF NASH BARGAINING TO LOG-CONVEX UTILITY SETS
Strategies for distributing the system resources are usually based on certain notions of "fairness" or "efficiency." In this section, we focus on the game-theoretic strategy of Nash bargaining [1] , [12] , [13] , which is closely related to proportional fairness [2] . This approach is cooperative, i.e., users (or players) unanimously agree on some solution outcome . This outcome is generally better than the Nash equilibrium resulting from a noncooperative approach. The gain from cooperation can be substantial (see, e.g., [14] and [15] ). Nash bargaining was successfully applied to various multiuser communication scenarios, e.g., [16] - [21] .
In this section, we will show that the conventional Nash bargaining framework can be extended to certain log-convex utility sets.
Our approach is based on a change of variable , where is the utility of the th user. This is a common technique for exploiting hidden convexity (see, e.g., [5] - [11] ).
A. The Conventional Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS)
We begin by briefly reviewing the NBS, which was introduced by Nash [1] and extended later (see, e.g., [12] , [13] , [22] and references therein). The NBS in its standard form requires that the utility set is convex. In this section we will generalize these results to certain nonconvex sets. • is the disagreement point, which is the outcome in case that no agreement can be found. The class of sets with these properties is denoted by .
Definition 2:
Let be convex, then the NBS is the unique (single-valued) solution that fulfills the following axioms.
• Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO). The users should not be able to collectively improve upon the solution outcome, i.e.,
• Symmetry (SYM). If is symmetric, 1 then the outcome does only depend on the employed strategies and not on the identities of the users, i.e., . This does not mean that the utility set is symmetric, but rather that all users have the same priorities.
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). If is the solution outcome of some utility set , then is also the solution outcome of every subset containing , i.e.,
• Scale Transformation Covariance (STC). The optimization strategy is invariant with respect to a component-wise scaling of the region. 2 That is, for every , and all with and , we have
If the utility set is compact convex comprehensive, then the single-valued NBS fulfilling the four axioms is obtained by maximizing the product of utilities (Nash product).
(1)
In this paper, . This assumption is often made if the choice of the zero of the utility scales does not matter. This also makes sense in a wireless system which is subject to channel fluctuations, so no minimum performance can be guaranteed. This leads to the problem formulation (2) Since , the optimum (2) can be found by solving (3) In the following, we will refer to strategy (3) as proportional fairness (PF). In its original definition [2] , a vector is said to be proportionally fair if for any other feasible vector the aggregated proportional change is nonpositive (see also [23] ). For convex sets, this unique point is obtained as the optimizer of (3). In this case, Nash bargaining and proportional fairness are equivalent [2] , [16] . This relates the NBS to 1 a known fairness criterion (see also [16] , [17] , [19] , [20] , and [24] ). In this paper we are interested in certain nonconvex sets which are strictly convex after a logarithmic transformation (strict log-convexity). Because of nonconvexity, it remains to be shown whether (3) is still equivalent to the original definition of proportional fairness [25] . We will refer to (3) as "proportional fairness." It will be shown that the property of strict log-convexity is sufficient to ensure a unique optimizer of (3).
B. Logarithmic Transformation
For every compact convex set from , the product maximizer (2) is the single-valued NBS characterized by the axioms WPO, SYM, IIA, and STC. However, convexity does not need to be fulfilled. An example is the SINR region discussed in Section III.
A standard approach is to convexify the utility set based on randomization arguments (see, e.g., [21] and [26] ), or by resource sharing. However, such a strategy is not always possible or even relevant. Again, the SINR region provides an example of a performance measure for which convexification is difficult to justify. Extensions and modifications of the NBS to nonconvex utility sets have been studied in the literature, e.g., [26] - [29] . However, the motivation of these papers is quite different from our approach.
In this section we will show that the key properties of the standard Nash bargaining framework extend to certain nonconvex sets. To this end, consider the function , where . The image set of is (4) Definition 3: We say that a set is a log-convex set if is convex. The boundary of the utility set is denoted by .
Definition 4:
A boundary point is said to be Pareto optimal if there is no with . The set of all Pareto optimal boundary points (the Pareto boundary) is denoted by . From a practical point of view, Pareto optimality means that it is not possible to improve the performance of one user without decreasing the performance of another user.
Definition 5:
By we denote the family of all closed downward-comprehensive utility sets such that the image set is convex and the following additional property is fulfilled: For any , the connecting line , with , is contained in the interior of . By we denote the family of all , which are additionally bounded, thus compact.
Definition 5 is illustrated in Fig. 1 . Note that compactness and comprehensiveness are preserved by the log-transformation. That is, is compact comprehensive if and only if is compact comprehensive. Every convex set from is contained in , but not conversely. Thus, is more general than the class of standard sets described by Definition 1. In the following we show that for any , product maximization (2) yields the single-valued NBS characterized by axioms WPO, SYM, IIA, and STC. This extends the classical Nash bargaining framework to certain nonconvex sets.
The properties of play an important role for the proof of uniqueness. We also exploit that the axioms WPO, SYM, IIA, and STC have direct counterparts for the image set . This is straightforward for axioms WPO, SYM, and IIA, which are not affected by the logarithmic transformation. That is, axiom WPO in the utility set corresponds directly to WPO in the image set . The same holds for axioms SYM and IIA. We will denote the axioms associated with the image set by , , and . Axiom STC in the utility set also has a direct correspondence for the image set . Consider an arbitrary translation , leading to a translated set , defined as Also, let be the log-transformed Nash bargaining solution, i.e., . Since the disagreement point is zero in our case, axiom STC becomes . In the log-transformed domain, this corresponds to (5) We will refer to (5) as . It is now shown that the transformed axioms are associated with a unique solution outcome in the transformed set.
Theorem 1:
For an arbitrary set , the solution outcome in the transformed set satisfies axioms , , , and if and only if it is the unique maximizer (6) Proof: Non-Pareto-optimal boundary segments parallel to the axes can be safely excluded from the proof, since such points cannot be the solution of the product maximization (2). Thus, without loss of generality we can assume that is strictly convex.
Given the properties of the region and its image set , it is clear that the solution (6) satisfies the axioms , , , and . It remains to show the converse. Consider a bargaining strategy on , that satisfies the axioms , , , . We now show that these axioms are fulfilled by a unique solution, which is the optimizer of (6). This is illustrated by Fig. 2 .
Consider the set
Because of the property (5), we know that the strategy is invariant with respect to a translation of the region. Thus, without loss of generality we can assume , and
That is, is the unique point which is on the boundaries of both sets and . Since is upper-bounded by definition, there is a such that Thus, is a subset of the set
The set is symmetric and strictly convex. Let be the smallest symmetric and strictly convex closed set that fulfills (8) Since is upper-bounded, the set is compact. It is also strictly convex comprehensive, thus it is contained in , which is the class of all sets such that . Because of axiom , it follows that describes a supporting hyperplane for , i.e., is an optimizer of Now, and . Because of axiom , we have (9) which concludes the proof.
Consequently, for all the optimization (9) in the transformed domain leads to the unique optimum . Because of the one-to-one logarithmic mapping between the sets and , we have the following result.
Corollary 1: Let . Then axioms WPO, SYM, STC, and IIA are satisfied by the unique solution (10) This result holds for arbitrary utility sets from , including the conventional case of convex sets. In the remainder we will study a wireless communication scenario where such a nonconvex set from occurs. This will be discussed later in Section V.
III. INTERFERENCE-COUPLED WIRELESS SYSTEMS BASED ON LOG-CONVEX INTERFERENCE FUNCTIONS
In this section we study the SINR region of an interference-coupled multiuser system with power constraints. It will be shown how Pareto optimality of boundaries points (see Definition 4) depends on the interference coupling between the users.
Consider users with transmit powers . The noise power at each receiver is . Hence, the SINR at each receiver depends on the extended power vector (11) The resulting SINR of user is , where is the interference (plus noise) as a function of .
A. Interference Functions
An axiomatic approach to interference modeling was proposed by Yates in [30] , and extended in [31] , [32] . In this work, mutual interference was modeled by a framework of axioms if . This model is sufficiently general to incorporate cross-layer effects and it serves as a theoretical basis for many algorithms. Examples include beamforming [33] - [36] , CDMA [37] , [38] , base station assignment [39] , [40] , and robust designs [41] , [42] .
In this paper we use a different axiomatic framework that was introduced in [43] . (12) where is a vector of interference coupling coefficients. The axiomatic framework A1-A4 is closely connected with the standard interference functions. For any constant noise power , the function is standard. Conversely, any standard interference function can be expressed within the framework A1-A4 [44] . Let be a standard interference function, then (13) is an interference function fulfilling A1-A4.
For more details about the relationship between the framework A1-A4 and Yates' standard interference functions, the reader is referred to [43] . For the purpose of this paper it is sufficient to know that there is such a connection and that all the results of this paper are also applicable to standard interference functions. The reason for using A1-A4 is that it enables us to use previous results [3] , where logarithmic convexity was studied. Some of the following results use this property.
B. The SINR Region Under Power Constraints
Consider the feasible SINR region for users , with individual power constraints , which is defined as the sublevel set (14) where and is a vector of SINR values. A point is feasible if , where
The structure of the SINR set depends on the properties of the indicator function , which in turn depends on the properties of the underlying interference functions , as well as on the chosen power constraints . It can be observed that itself is an "interference function" fulfilling the core axioms A1, A2, A3. This was exploited in [45] , where it was shown that any comprehensive subset of can be expressed as a sublevel set of an interference function. Sublevel sets of convex functions are convex, thus is a closed convex set from if is convex. However, convexity of does generally not hold, so SINR regions are typically nonconvex.
The SINR region under a sum power constraint is defined as (16) where (17) Both regions and will be analyzed in the following, where it will turn out that the sum-power constrained region is relatively easy to handle because the users are connected via a shared power budget. The region is more complicated in that tradeoffs generally depend on interference coupling. Therefore, a large part of our analysis will focus on the effects of interference coupling.
In this paper we focus on log-convex interference functions, which will be introduced in the following section. Log-convex interference functions are rich in terms of analytical possibilities. This will be exploited in the remainder of this paper, where we will study conditions for Pareto optimality and strict logarithmic convexity of the SINR regions.
C. Log-Convex Interference Functions
We will now discuss the important subclass of log-convex interference functions. Throughout this paper, all interference functions are assumed to be log-convex.
For an explanation, consider the function , which is said to be log-convex on if is convex, or equivalently [46] (18) for arbitrary .
Definition 8:
The interference function is a log-convex interference function if is log-convex on . Note that the log-convexity in Definition 8 is based on a change of variable (component-wise exponential). Such a technique was already used by Sung [5] in the context of linear interference functions, and later in [6] - [11] .
Some examples of log-convex interference functions are as follows.
Example 1:
The linear function (12) is a log-convex interference function in the sense of Definition 8.
Example 2:
The coefficients in (12) can adapt to the current interference situation. An example is the "worst-case interference" (19) The parameter can stand for some uncertainty, chosen from a compact uncertainty set . Such worst-case interference functions are used, e.g., in the context of robust power control [41] , [42] . The function (19) is a log-convex interference function.
Example 3:
It was shown in [44] that any convex interference function is log-convex in the sense of Definition 8. That is, if is convex, then is log-convex. The converse is not true, however. Therefore, the class of log-convex interference functions is broader than the class of convex interference functions. Special cases of convex interference functions include the linear function (12) and the worst-case function (19) . Hence, the requirement of log-convexity is relatively weak in comparison to many other existing interference models.
If the interference functions are linear, e.g., , with coupling coefficients , and with an unconstrained power set , then the resulting SINR region is known to be log-convex. This was shown in [5] , and extended in [6] - [8] . Recent work [4] provides conditions under which the transformed set is strictly convex, as required by Nash bargaining. However, all these results are restricted to linear interference functions. In this paper we consider the more general interference framework A1-A4 (see Definition 7). For this model, convexity of the SINR region on a logarithmic scale was shown in [3] . However, the characterization of Pareto optimality and strict convexity is still an open problem, which will be addressed in the following sections.
IV. SINR REGION WITH INDIVIDUAL POWER CONSTRAINTS
Consider log-convex interference functions and individual power limits . Let be any boundary point of the resulting region . The set of all power vectors achieving is (20) For the following analysis, it is important to note that the set can contain multiple elements. This is most easily explained by an example, as follows.
Example 4: Consider a 2-user Gaussian multiple access channel (MAC) with successive interference cancellation, normalized noise , and a given decoding order 1, 2. The SINR of the users are
Assuming power constraints and , we obtain an SINR region as depicted in Fig. 3 .
A. Properties of Boundary Points
Consider the boundary point depicted in Fig. 3 . This point is achieved by , and therefore . This vector achieves with component-wise minimum power. However, is not the only element of . Because of the assumed interference cancellation, we can increase the power (and thus the SINR) of User 1, without reducing the SINR at User 2. If both users transmit with maximum power then the corner point is achieved. This power vector is also contained in because , so the SINR targets are still fulfilled. The following fixed point iteration will play an important role in our analysis. [30] . A proof for the interference framework A1-A4 was given in [43] .
(21)
The next lemma shows that the inequality constraint in (20) is always fulfilled with equality for at least one component, otherwise could not be a boundary point.
Lemma 2:
For any boundary point , consider an arbitrary . There always exists a such that . Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose for all . Then (22) This is a contradiction because for any boundary point we have .
Sometimes we can find a power vector such that one or more components of are surpassed, as illustrated in Fig. 3 . The corresponding indices are collected in an index set defined as follows.
Definition 9:
For any boundary point , let be the set of all such that there exists a with . For the point , in Fig. 3 , this is the first user, whose power can be increased without decreasing the performance of User 2. We are only interested in the case where is nonempty. Otherwise the fixed point is the unique solution, which is trivial. Also, we know from Lemma 2 that . The next theorem shows that there always exists a vector for which strict inequality holds for all simultaneously. (25) is strictly less than one, and therefore
In the same way, we can combine with another vector with . This leads to a new vector which fulfills
Repeating this procedure for all , we obtain the desired vector fulfilling (23).
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.
Corollary 2:
Let be the fixed point defined in Lemma 1. All other quantities are defined as in Theorem 2. We have (Lemma 1) and thus for all (26) That is, the inequality is strict for all components from . In the following we will refer to as "oversized users." The following theorem shows that the oversized users have no impact on the interference experienced by the other users . That is, the interference is the same as if we would use the minimum-power vector . Also, the powers of users cannot be oversized. Proof: This follows from Theorem 3 and the monotonicity axiom A3.
Note that and are both contained in , so the resulting SINR values are contained in the feasible SINR region. However, we cannot infer from Corollary 3 that the same holds for .
For from we can reduce this component without affecting the interference power. This holds for but not necessarily for vectors outside this area. This is because we cannot rely on strict monotonicity, as later in this section. We know that for the interference functions for such do not depend on the indices for which .
B. Interference Coupling
The structure of the SINR region depends on how the users are coupled by interference. In order to model the coupling between the axiomatic log-convex interference functions, we use the approach in [3] .
We begin with the definition of the local dependency matrix, which does depend on the choice of . We define as the allzero vector with the th component set to one.
if there exists a such that the function is strictly monotonically decreasing for . otherwise.
We say that an interference function depends on a power if there exists an arbitrary such that . The interference coupling between users is characterized by the global dependency matrix defined as follows.
if there exists a such that , otherwise.
(32)
The nonzero entries in mark the transmitter/receiver pairs which are coupled by interference. A zero entry means that no interference is received, no matter how large the transmission power is. As an example, consider users that are assigned to different orthogonal resources, or separated by adaptive interference rejection techniques.
In this paper, we assume that there is no self-interference. That is, the elements of the main diagonal are zero.
Note, that this coupling model includes the widely used concept of a "link gain matrix" as a special case. In the remainder of this paper we will use in order to analyze how the interference coupling affects the structure of the boundary.
C. Analysis of the Pareto Boundary
Thus far, we have focused on the interference coupling aspects. Now, we will analyze QoS sets resulting from these interference models. In this paper, QoS can stand for some arbitrary performance measure, which depends on the SINR by a strictly monotone and continuous function defined on . The QoS of user is (33) Common examples are MMSE, BER, delay, or capacity [43] .
Let be the inverse function of , then is the minimum SINR level needed by the th user to satisfy the QoS target . Let be a vector of QoS values from some QoS region , then the associated SINR vector is (34) QoS values are feasible if and only if . The QoS feasible set is the sublevel set (35) We are now interested in the boundary of , which is characterized by .
Lemma 3:
A boundary point is Pareto optimal if and only if is Pareto optimal. Proof: This is a direct consequence of the strictly monotonic mapping (33) . Pareto optimal points in are mapped to Pareto optimal points in and vice versa. Non-Pareto boundary segments in are parallel to the coordinate axes. Those segments are mapped to parallel segments in and vice versa.
From Lemma 3 it follows that we can analyze Pareto optimality of by focusing on the underlying SINR set instead.
As an example, we discuss the capacity region resulting from Example 4. Assuming that no time-sharing or rate-splitting can be performed, we obtain the capacity region depicted in Fig. 4 . Note, that a part of the boundary is not Pareto optimal.
With Theorem 2 we show the following result. We can reduce the power of the oversized user without violating the feasibility condition. That is, there exists a and a such that (38) By keeping all the other components fixed, we obtain a new vector . Because of monotonicity A3 we have , and with (38) we know that . From (37) we know that by reducing the power of user we reduce the interference of user . Thus This contradicts (24) from Theorem 2, thus concluding the proof.
D. Concept of Strongly Coupled Users
We will now introduce the new concept of strongly coupled users. This will prove useful in further characterizing the Pareto optimal boundary. It will turn out (Theorem 7) that this is an equivalent way of expressing Pareto optimality.
Definition 10: A -user system is said to be strongly coupled with power limits , if for any point , for which there is a with (39) there exists a vector such that (40) The condition (40) reflects a practically relevant property: If it is possible to fulfill SINR requirements , and one user gets more than required, then all users are strongly coupled if and only if all users benefit from reducing the oversized user's power. This is an important aspect of "fairness" because it provides a mechanism for trading off resources between users.
Theorem 5: If interference functions
with power limits are strongly coupled, then every boundary point is Pareto optimal.
Proof: Assume that are strongly coupled. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that there is a boundary point that is not Pareto optimal. Then there is a such that we can find a with . Consider the indicator function , as defined by (22) . Because , the vector is associated with a such that . Therefore (41) Because the interference functions are strongly coupled by assumption, there is a such that (42) This would imply (43) which is a contradiction. Thus, every boundary point is Pareto optimal.
An obvious question is: does the converse of Theorem 5 hold? That is, does a Pareto optimal boundary imply a strongly coupled system? This will be shown in Section IV-F under the additional assumption of strict monotonicity. Without strict monotonicity we only have the following result. (44) with strict inequality for at least one component, then there exists a with (45) Proof: From assumption (44) it follows that is contained in the feasible region. However, it cannot be a boundary point because of the assumed strict inequality for one component. This would contradict the assumption of Pareto optimality. Thus, must be contained in the interior of the region, for which . So there exists a vector that fulfills the fixed point equation (46) where .
Note that Theorem 6 is not the converse of Theorem 5. The result only holds for interior points, not for the boundary. In the following Section IV-F we will make the additional assumption of strict monotonicity. Under this additional condition the converse will be shown. Also, the connection with the dependency matrix will be explained.
E. Strict Monotonicity on the Dependency Set
We now introduce the additional property of strict monotonicity on the dependency set. The definition of the dependency set is based on the dependency matrix . The dependency set of user is (47) This is the set of transmitters which have impact on user . The set is always nonempty because axiom A1 rules out the trivial case , .
Definition 11 (Strict Monotonicity):
is said to be strictly monotonic (on its dependency set ) if for arbitrary , , the inequality , with for some , implies . So is strictly increasing in at least one power component.
The assumption of strict monotonicity enables us to prove the converse of Theorem 5. In addition, it provides a link between the dependency matrix and Pareto optimality. This is summarized by the next theorem.
Theorem 7: Consider a -user system with individual power limits and interference functions that are strictly monotonic on their respective dependency sets. Then the following statements are equivalent:
• The system is strongly coupled (Definition 10).
• The dependency matrix is irreducible.
• Every boundary point is Pareto optimal.
Proof: We first show that the dependency matrix is irreducible if and only if every boundary point is Pareto optimal.
The first part is by contradiction. Suppose that is irreducible but some boundary point is not Pareto optimal (see Definition 4). Then has multiple elements and there is a vector as defined in Theorem 2. From Lemma 4 it follows that is reducible. However, this is a contradiction because irreducibility of implies irreducibility of . This is shown as follows. The proof is again by contradiction. We need to show that implies for any . Suppose that , then we know from (31) that is constant for all . This means that does not depend on the th component, which contradicts the assumption of strict monotonicity, thus proving that is irreducible. Thus, we have shown that an irreducible dependency matrix implies a Pareto optimal boundary. Conversely, we need to show that if an arbitrary boundary point is Pareto optimal then is irreducible. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that is reducible. Without loss of generality we can assume that has Frobenius normal form [47] , with irreducible matrices along the main diagonal. Such a canonical form can always be achieved by a symmetric permutation of rows and columns of . Suppose that the first (isolated) block has a dimension . This means that the first interference functions do not depend on the components . Thus, the vector leads to SINR values for . We introduce the set . For arbitrary we define
Consider such that . Because of the noise and power constraints, we know from [30] We have . Similar to (49) it is shown that . Thus, holds, which means that both and are boundary points. That is, we can minimize components of without leaving the boundary, which contradicts the assumption of Pareto optimality.
Next, we show that the system is strongly coupled if and only if the dependency matrix is irreducible. Assume that is irreducible. Consider an arbitrary boundary point such that there is a with . This inequality is strict for at least on component , so we can decrease without violating the inequality. Because of the assumed strict monotonicity, decreasing decreases the interference of the users in the dependency set . These users can in turn reduce their powers without without violating the above inequality. Irreducibility means that, in the graph of there is a path from any point to any other point. Thus, by successively decreasing the components of , we obtain a vector with (50) That is, the users are strongly coupled.
Having shown that irreducibility implies a strongly coupled system, it remains to show that if is reducible then the system cannot be strongly coupled. To this end, we use the SINR vectors and that were already introduced earlier in the proof. The point is achieved by , thus However, there is no vector with
Because then could not be a boundary point.
Theorem 7 will be needed in the next section.
V. STRICT LOG-CONVEXITY OF SINR FEASIBLE SETS
In this section we will address another important property, namely strict log-convexity. A connection between log-convex interference functions and log-convex SINR regions was already observed in previous work, e.g., [3] . In this section we will complement and extend previous work by adding power constraints. In particular, we will derive conditions for strict log-convexity of the SINR regions and , defined by (14) and (16), respectively. It will turn out that strict log-convexity depends on how users are coupled.
A. Total Power Constraint
Assume that the sum of all transmission powers is limited by . The next theorem shows that the resulting SINR set is strictly convex after log-transformation. 
Since inequality (56) is strict, there exists a , and a new vector that also fulfills the inequality. By exploiting axioms A2 and A4, we have (57) From A3 it follows that inequality (53) is strict. Thus, , which means that for any , the point is in the strict interior of the region, thus proving strict log-convexity of the SINR region.
Strict log-convexity implies Pareto optimality. It remains to show that . The transformed set is closed. This can be observed from definition (16) . It is also upper-bounded because of the power constraint and the assumption of noise. Finally, the entire boundary is Pareto optimal, thus is fulfilled.
As a consequence of Theorem 8, the solution of (3), respectively, (2) , is the single-valued NBS. The SINR region is a compact set, and therefore the existence of the unique optimizer is guaranteed.
B. Individual Power Constraints
The previous section has shown that the possible occurrence of interference-free users does not matter under a sum-power constraint, because the users are always coupled by sharing a common power budget. However, in order to analyze the behavior under individual power constraints, we need to take into account the interference coupling characterized by . We now study under which conditions the SINR region , defined by (14) , is strictly log-convex. Then, we study under which conditions the SINR region is contained in . We begin by defining strictly log-convex interference functions.
Definition 12 (Strict Log-Convexity): A log-convex interference function is said to be strictly log-convex if for all , for which there is some with , the following inequality holds: (58) where . The following lemma shows that strict log-convexity implies strict monotonicity.
Lemma 5: Every strictly log-convex interference function is strictly monotonic on its dependency set (see Definition 11) .
Proof: Consider an arbitrary fixed vector , and an arbitrary . We define Note that the converse of Lemma 5 is not true. The following example shows a strictly monotone interference function which is not strictly log-convex. That is, strict monotonicity is weaker than strict log-convexity. Note that the constant noise component plays a crucial role in the proof of Lemma 6. Axiom A4 implies strict monotonicity with respect to . We can use Lemma 6 to derive a necessary and sufficient condition for strict log-convexity.
Theorem 9:
Let be strictly log-convex interference functions. The transformed SINR region is strictly convex if and only if is irreducible.
Proof:
are strictly log-convex and thus they are also strictly monotonic on their respective dependency set (see Lemma 5) . If the region is strictly convex, then the entire boundary is Pareto optimal. Theorem 7 implies that is irreducible.
It remains to show that irreducibility implies a strictly convex region. Consider arbitrary boundary points and with corresponding power vectors and . As in the proof of where we have used the change of variable . The weights account for possible user priorities. Note that minimizing (69) is equivalent to maximizing . For equal weights, this is a special case of the optimization problem (3) , where the utility is the SINR.
Convexity of was already shown in [3] . However, in order to show that the SINR region is contained in , we need strict convexity. Here we have exploited (66) and log-convexity of .
The next corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 10.
Corollary 4:
The optimization problem (71) has exactly one minimizer.
It was shown in Section II that for any set the properties of the classical Nash bargaining framework are preserved. The following theorem shows a sufficient condition for the SINR region to be contained in . The result builds on Theorem 10.
Note that sets from do not need to be strictly log-convex (see Fig. 1 ). Thus, irreducibility of , which was required in Theorem 9, is not necessary in this case.
Theorem 11:
Let be defined as in Lemma 6. Then the SINR region is contained in . Proof: The region is (relatively) closed and upper-bounded because of the power constraints. The image set is closed and upper-bounded. We need to show that for two arbitrary Pareto optimal boundary points , any point , with , is contained in the interior of the set. This is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that there is a such that is not in the interior. Since is convex comprehensive [3] , this can only be fulfilled if The set of maximizers of (73) is a convex set. For every maximizer there is a corresponding vector which fulfills the power constraints, and is a solution of (74) That is, (74) has no unique optimum. This is a contradiction because is strictly convex.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have analyzed log-convex utility regions, resulting from different assumptions and power constraints and interference coupling. This "hidden convexity" is useful for developing resource allocation strategies that operate on the boundary of the region. As an example, we have analyzed the Nash bargaining problem. We have shown that the properties of the classical Nash bargaining solution are preserved for certain nonconvex utility sets. This paper provides a theoretical basis for exploiting log-convexity in interference-coupled multiuser networks and extends previous results in [4] .
The results are potentially useful for different kinds of resource allocation problems. Nash bargaining is just one possible operating point. Other types of fairness can be studied in future work. 
